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Abstract 
 
Interviews were conducted with risk managers in a case-study area in England to 
determine the factors influencing the choice between more traditional, engineering based, 
adaptation to flood risk and those focussing on vulnerability reduction. The findings of 
in-depth analysis of these interviews have implications for climate change adaptation as a 
whole. They suggest that government policies to implement a broader range of adaptation 
measures might be hampered by institutional cultures formed when engineered 
approaches were the norm. Political decentralisation and the fashion for public 
consultation exacerbate this effect, leaving decision-makers more responsive to the 
influence of those directly affected by natural hazards than they are to policy 
pronouncements by government. 
 
Graphical abstract 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Adaptation to climate change is an essential complement to greenhouse gas mitigation 
and can provide „breathing space‟ for global emissions trajectories (Adger et al., 2005). 
As the prospect of climate change becomes more widely accepted, so existing practices 
for adaptation to environmental risks need to be reviewed. Not only does adaptation need 
to increase; in order to ensure social justice and environmental sustainability, a wider 
range of strategies needs to be used. 
 
The range of options available is illustrated by Figure 1, which lists some of the 
adaptation measures available for the management of one common risk: that of flooding. 
These options include the more traditional highly engineered, or structural, measures that 
reduce the probability of a flood, but also non-structural measures, which reduce 
vulnerability.   
 
Figure 1 A categorisation of flood risk management measures into structural and  
non-structural (adapted from Parker, 2007) 
 
This paper looks at some of the institutional and cultural barriers to an expansion of the 
range of such measures that is used. Taking flood risk in the UK as an example, it 
considers the problems faced when the organisations that are tasked with managing 
societal exposure to environmental risks are asked to broaden the range of techniques 
they use. It suggests that cultures and rationalities that have become embedded within 
these organisations as a result of previous, more narrowly defined, policies can present a 
significant barrier to adaptation and limit the ability of society to respond flexibly and 
with fairness to climate change. 
 
The argument presented draws on case-study research relating to the development of a 
flood risk management strategy in an area near London, southeast England. In-depth 
interviews with stakeholders and decision-makers involved in the strategy design reveal 
an ingrained and continuing institutional preference for the construction of large-scale 
flood defence schemes and the legitimation of this by a representation of public opinion 
as favouring this preference. Government policies for the diversification of adaptation 
measures have, as yet, borne relatively little fruit. This paper concludes that in an age 
where decentralisation has weakened the command powers of central governments 
(Rhodes, 1997) institutional inertia is partly responsible for this weakening because it 
slows responsiveness to policy innovation.  
 
1.1 The changing policy context 
 
In recent years, the emphasis within the public discourse on flood risk management 
discourse has shifted away from large-scale engineering measures and towards the 
promotion of a broader range of adaptation measures (Johnson et al., 2005). Hence, 
whereas in 1993 the Environment Agency‟s flood strategy only listed flood warnings and 
flood defence as its priority aims (Environment Agency, 1993), by 2005 the UK 
Government was clearly indicating its desire to see the use of an “integrated portfolio of 
approaches” to manage flood risk (Defra, 2005, p. 8). 
 
This change of policy direction resulted from a recognition that conventional means of 
reducing flood risk had become insufficient in relation to the scale and nature of the 
problem. In 1998, after a major flood revealed the extent of the risk to which the UK was 
still exposed, an independent review of the event (Bye and Horner, 1998) found that the 
extent and state of the nation‟s defences were not to blame and concluded that structural 
defences alone could never protect communities against the most extreme floods. Two 
years later, the occurrence of another large flood was rapidly followed by the publication 
of the synthesis report on climate change by the IPCC (2001). The consequence of these 
events was the emergence of a general view that the frequency of flooding and the extent 
of the exposure were not only higher than previously thought, but were also increasing.  
 
A government-sponsored investigation into the likely effects of climate change confirmed 
this view (Evans et al., 2004a; 2004b). Looking at a number of future economic and 
political scenarios, it concluded that if expenditure on flood defence was maintained at 
existing levels, annual damage levels for England and Wales, estimated at the time as £1 
billion per year, would rise to between £1.6 billion and £29 billion by the 2080s. Over the 
same period, it reported, the number of people living in high risk areas would increase 
from 1.4 million to between 2 million and 3.9 million (Evans et al 2004b).
i
  
 
As shown in Table 1, expert opinion gathered by Evans et al. suggested that river and 
coastal defence reduced risk exposure by far more than other types of measures. Table 1 
shows predicted damage reductions for different elements of the proposed portfolio.  
 
                                                 
i
 The large differences between estimates are the result of the use of different assumptions about future 
economic systems and policies and different assumed levels of economic growth. 
Table 1 Examples adaptation measures and their predicted effectiveness at reducing flood damage (adapted 
from Evans et al., 2004b, pp. 43 and 46)
a
 
 
Type of adaptation measure Reduction in 
damage 
  
River defences 38% 
Coastal defences 32% 
Urban storage, conveyance and infiltration 5% 
Event management (forecasting and warning, 
flood-fighting, damage avoidance) 
21% 
Land-use planning and management 24% 
Retro-fitting existing homes with flood protection 19% 
a 
The authors calculated figures for a number of possible scenarios of world economic policy and 
economic growth. The numbers shown here reflect their estimates for just one of these scenarios, in 
which growth and income were relatively low and government intervention relatively high. 
 
Although a risk management system dominated by defence was seen as delivering the 
most effective means of reducing damage, the study concluded that such a system does 
not deliver either environmental quality or social justice (2004b). For example, it fails to 
provide distributive justice to small groups of at-risk properties, for whom per-property 
costs are usually too high to justify defence measures and which often, therefore, receive 
no state investment at all in risk reduction. Similarly, it tends to undervalue the 
environmental benefits of the creation of wetlands and wash-lands, which reduce flood 
risk while also contributing to targets such as those in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the European Water Framework Directive.  
 
The authors of the study concluded that, if the issues of environmental quality and social 
justice were to be addressed as well as that of damage reduction, a far broader “portfolio 
of measures” was required (2004b). This view was subsequently adopted by the 
Government in its influential 2005 strategy, Making Space for Water (Defra, 2005).  
 
However, implementation of this aspect of central government policy has been slow. 
Although a whole range of measures is now under development or in use across England, 
those that do not rely on defence still form a weaker part of the “portfolio” of approaches. 
For example, the independent review of the 2007 floods (Pitt, 2008) argues that planning 
controls in flood risk areas are not applied rigorously enough and that there is a lack of a 
clear policy for the use of temporary and demountable defences. It also suggests that 
property-level adaptation measures are insufficiently promoted, citing Harries‟ (2008a) 
finding that fewer than 6% of at-risk householders who have never been flooded have 
implemented even the simplest forms of such measures. Similarly, although awareness-
raising and flood warnings have received significant investment,  warning systems are 
seen as inadequate by flood victims (Parker et al., 2009) and two-fifths of residents of at-
risk areas remain unaware that they are at risk (Harries 2008a). 
 
 
1.2 Barriers to policy change 
 
Barriers to policy change are to be found at the level both of the policy-making function 
in central government and within the organisations responsible for implementing policy.  
 
There are at least two ways in which the UK government has itself helped entrench the 
bias toward structural measures. For example, a high-profile agreement between the 
government and the Association of British Insurers (ABI) asserts that ABI members will 
continue to offer insurance to high-risk households only if the Environment Agency 
instigates „„greater investment in defences [...] and faster and more consistent decisions 
on flood defences‟‟ (quoted in ibid, p136), and ABI members promise to offer cover to 
new customers only if their home is not at “significant risk” of flooding (ABI 2010). 
Embedded within these statements is an assumption that flood risk is to be managed by 
structural measures (“flood defences”). Similarly, „significant risk‟ is defined purely in 
terms of probability, thereby implying that the key to ABI-central government 
collaboration is the prevention of floods (using structural measures) rather than the 
reduction of flood vulnerability (using non-structural measures). 
 
A similar implication is contained within the government‟s five outcome targets for flood 
risk management capital programmes (Defra Secretary of State, 2008). The first of these 
outcome measures specifies the average benefit cost ratio that must be achieved for the 
overall package of projects that are implemented. Due to a deficit in the skills and 
knowledge necessary for the evaluation of the costs and benefits of non-structural 
measures, this is likely to cause a tilt towards structural measures, which are more 
familiar and more easily evaluated. Of the remaining four targets, two specify 
biodiversity and habitat targets that can only be contributed to by structural measures and 
two specify reductions in flooding probability. 
 
Although these examples reveal an ambiguity in the government‟s communication of 
their desire for a broader portfolio of flood risk management measures, this discussion 
focuses on the barriers to that aim that are presented by those are responsible for 
implementing government policy. In the rest of this section, it is argued that attempts to 
change behaviours and assert new rationalities have met with resistance at the point of 
delivery and that this effect has been exacerbated by a reduction in the ability of policy-
makers to exert direct control over policy implementation. 
 
1.2.1 Resistance at the point of delivery 
 
Much resistance to policy change at the point of delivery results from policy feedback – 
the legacies of previous policies and the resulting institutional inertia. These legacies can 
take many forms.  
 
Usually, the literature on policy feedback refers to the legacy of systems and procedures 
created by previous policies (Elmore, 1978; 1979). An example in the arena of flood risk 
management is the use of benefit cost analysis, a prioritisation tool popularised by the US 
Army Corps of Engineers (Porter, 1995) and embedded into practice in England as a 
result of a desire to promote economic efficiency and of the focus of early policies on 
engineered solutions. Benefit cost analysis requires the identification of quantified 
economic values for the policy options under consideration. However, it is difficult to 
allocate values to the benefits of non-structural measures because they often involve a 
degree of behaviour change and this is relatively unpredictable. Furthermore, given that 
non-structural methods have not been very common in the past, there is a lack of 
established procedures and data for their evaluation. As a result, the ability of decision-
makers to promote non-structural measures is constrained by the stringencies of the 
prioritisation system and by their inability to meet its requirements with regard to such 
measures.  
 
In addition to legacies relating to procedures and systems, however, policy feedback can 
also leave cultural legacies, for example, by impacting on the social identity of delivery 
organisations. It is on this latter aspect that this paper concentrates. 
 
Social identity is of key importance for the understanding of behaviour (Tajfel, 1982; 
Turner, 1985; Abrams and Hogg, 1990). Consisting of the habits, preferences and 
“rationalised myths” of organisations (Scott, 1983, p. 14), social identities provide the 
sense of shared purpose that allows institutions to function effectively (see Meyer and 
Rowen, 1977). Moreover, because adherence to a social identity is seen to promise 
acceptance, mutual support, protection and advancement, any threat to that identity tends 
to be collectively resisted by all those affected.  
 
Within each of their life contexts, people select for themselves the most salient social 
identity and then divide other actors into those who share this identity with them (the in-
group) and those who do not (the out-group). To try to ensure recognition and support 
from within their chosen in-group, individual members seek to conform to the core 
qualities of that group, as embodied by notional proto-typical members. Furthermore, 
they construct their representations of the world in such a way as to legitimise the 
behaviours associated with these qualities; accentuating the good points of the in-group 
while simultaneously emphasising the bad points of out-group behaviours – especially 
those perceived as possible threats (Abrams and Hogg, 1990). 
 
Included in the behaviours considered in this way are forms of rationality. The type of 
rationality a person employs identifies him or her as an adherent to a particular culture 
and, therefore, as a member of a particular social identity group. The defence of that form 
of rationality is also a defence of the integrity of the in-group. We can therefore see that, 
as argued in Institutional Theory (e.g. Scott, 2005), cultural systems and models of 
rationality are conjoined. 
 
It is for this reason that policy feedback limits the ability of central policy-makers to 
introduce changes in policy direction (Skocpol, 1992; Pierson and Smith, 1994). Policies 
are what Hudson and Lowe (2004) call sticky. They mould the cultural and social 
identities of the people who deliver them, creating in-groups that then resist any changes 
that are perceived as threats to their identities. This is why successful changes in policy 
direction require bottom-up support as well as top-down instruction (Sabatier, 1988).  
 The resistance resulting from policy feedback can be overcome by what Krasner (1988) 
calls exogenous shocks: events that shake the legitimacy of the assumptive worlds within 
the architecture of social identities and thereby facilitate change. Due to their moral force, 
these shocks also transcend the social divides caused by social identity groupings and 
allow increased social exchange between in-groups and out-groups. As a result, 
exogenous shocks create windows of opportunity in which policy change is more 
possible. Flood events large enough to attract widespread criticism of the state are 
examples of such shocks (Johnson et al., 2005). In England, the 1947 floods are said to 
have „catalysed‟ a major revision of the scale of defences needed to protect agricultural 
land, the 1953 East Coast floods to have prompted the development of a storm-tide 
warning system and the 2000 floods to have precipitated a toughening-up of the land-use 
planning regime (ibid).  
 
1.2.2 Reduction in the ability of policy-makers to excerpt control 
 
The impact of front-line resistance to policy shifts, described above, is particularly acute 
in situations where a separation of the functions of policy making and policy 
implementation has loosened the control of central government policy-makers over the 
delivery of policy. Such is the case with regard to flood risk in England.  
 
A full description of governance arrangements for UK flood risk management can be 
found in Johnson and Penning-Rowsell (2010) but it is important to emphasise here that 
most flood risk management activity in England is implemented under the aegis of the 
Environment Agency, an arms-length agency funded by block grant from the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (known as Defra). As a quasi-independent 
agent of the government, the Environment Agency is only partly under the influence of 
central government and only projects requiring more than £100m capital funding require 
central government approval. Performance targets and monitoring are used by Defra to 
direct the Environment Agency‟s work, but these are seen by some commentators (e.g. 
Rhodes, 1996; 2008 as providing an imperfect tool for the implementation of central 
policy and as having reduced the ability of contemporary government departments such 
as Defra to implement central policy decisions (though see Holliday, 2000, for an 
alternative view). 
 
Furthermore, the choice of flood risk management strategy is affected by few legal and 
administrative constraints or obligations. National laws give permissive powers rather 
than duties to the Environment Agency, and Defra is limited by central government 
funding rules in its ability to ring-fence grant money to ensure it is used for flood risk 
management alone. Although European Union directives such as the Water Framework 
Directive and the Birds Directive have put some constraints on policy design, even the 
2007 European Floods Directive stops short of insisting on whether and how adaptation 
to flood risk should occur.  
 
Further decentralising forces are at work within the Environment Agency itself. 
Traditionally, decisions about flood risk management have been viewed as regional or 
local, with regional committees having an influential role that was enshrined in 
legislation (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2008). Although recent years have seen the creation 
of a central committee (the Environment Agency‟s National Review Group) to oversee 
the design and prioritisation of projects, the key strategies and measures for the 
management of flood risk in particular areas are still largely determined at the level of the 
Environment Agency‟s area and regional offices. Decisions about whether and how to 
respond to particular flood risk situations are often left, therefore, to local decision-
makers. 
 
As specified in Defra‟s strategy appraisal guidelines (Riddell and Green, 1999), the main 
criterion for the design of individual risk management schemes, is, in fact, the calculated 
ratio of a scheme‟s monetised benefits and costs – the benefit-cost ratio. Current 
performance targets stipulate that the average ratio of benefits to costs for the 
Environment Agency‟s capital programme should be at least 5:1 and that all projects 
should have an incremental ratio “robustly greater than 1” (Defra Secretary of State, 
2008). A ratio of 5:1 is, indeed, generally considered the minimum benchmark (Defra, 
2009) and projects with lower ratios are only funded on those rare occasions when they 
are considered an overriding political priority. However, comments by participants in this 
research, as well as the experiences of one of the authors over many years working with 
the industry, suggest that much consultancy time is employed trying to devise ways to 
evaluate evidence that achieve higher ratios and move projects higher up the priority list 
for funds. As a result, the prioritisation of a project can depend as much on the skill of the 
consultants involved as it does on the integral value of the project.  
 
Aside from the need to attain high benefit-cost ratios, teams of local Environment 
Agency staff are left with some discretion about the design and content of the scheme 
proposals that they put before national Environment Agency decision-making 
committees. The research reported here set out to explore the influence of professional 
and institutional cultures and particular local pressures on the type of adaptation measures 
proposed in these schemes and to understand how these factors affect the fulfilment of 
the government‟s desire to see the implementation of a wider portfolio of adaptation 
measures.  
 
2 Material and methods 
 
The investigation took as its case-study the Thames floodplain between Windsor and 
Richmond – a densely populated and prosperous area to the west of London (see Figure 
2). According to the Environment Agency (2007), a flood with a 1% annual probability 
would affect 15,000 properties and 37,000 residents in this area and would cause £400 
million worth of damage. Climate change, it is predicted, could increase flood flows in 
this area by between 5% and 10% over the next 50-100 years, causing key threshold 
levels within the floodplain topography to be reached more often and resulting in a 
substantial increase in flood frequency (ibid). 
 
Figure 2 Map of the case-study area, showing the main conurbations and some of the proposed structural 
flood risk management 
measure
At the time of the research, although £2m had been spent on designing a strategy to 
reduce this risk, no agreement had yet been reached on a suitable package of measures. 
Large-scale engineering projects such as the construction of diversion channels and the 
use of dredging were being considered (see Figure 2). However, the highly built-up 
nature of the floodplain, combined with potential disruption to environmentally 
designated areas and the habitat of one Red Book listed species of freshwater mussel, had 
delayed progress and added to predicted costs. The original study on which this paper is 
based set out to look at the decision-making processes that informed the strategy‟s design 
and to understand how and why the choices of particular types of adaptation measure 
were made.  
 
This area was selected for the case-study because the difficulty of implementing large-
scale engineering schemes had obliged decision-makers to look for additional measures. 
These included the use of demountable barriers to protect groups of properties, the 
promotion of household-level flood protection and resilience measures and the 
introduction of tighter land-use regulation along key flow routes.  
 
The main method used to meet the objective of the study was the depth or semi-
structured interview. This method was indicated by the exploratory character of this 
study and by the ability of in-depth interviews to reveal the hidden representations, 
discourses and assumptions that influence decisions. Participants for the study were 
selected to represent the actor groups that most influenced the design of the flood risk 
management strategy in the case-study area. Some of these were selected by the research 
team at the outset of the research; others became evident in the course of the early 
interviews. In all, ten interviews were conducted with a total of thirteen respondents. 
These included Environment Agency staff, the consultants hired to project-manage the 
development of the strategy, members of the strategy steering group and specialists 
brought in to advise on the social aspects of flood risk management (see Table 2).  
  
Table 2 Respondents in the case study 
 
Affiliation Role 
The Environment Agency Customer-side project manager 
 Area flood defence manager 
 Regional flood defence manager 
 Head office staff member responsible for approving funding 
for future development of the project and for reviewing the 
final scheme design 
The Regional Flood Defence 
Committee 
RFDC chairperson and member of the project steering 
group 
Engineering consultancy Project manager 
 Previous project manager 
 Graduate assistant 
University Advisor on social aspects of flood risk 
 Advisor on public attitudes to flood risk; designed and 
analysed a survey of resident attitudes 
Residents‟ flood forum Chairperson 
Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs 
Regional Engineer for the area until this post was abolished 
in 2005 
Political party Member of Parliament for a part of the case-study area 
 
The interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim and analysed using a form of 
textually oriented discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2003). This technique was selected in 
order to reveal the deeper cultural and linguistic factors that might be influencing 
decisions about the design of flood risk management schemes. Many analytical methods 
focus on the surface content of speech. In contrast, textually oriented discourse analysis 
aims to uncover the representations, discourses and working assumptions that, while not 
necessarily the subject of everyday reflection or conversation, nonetheless structure 
people‟s talk and influence their behaviour (see Potter and Wetherell, 1987). This form of 
analysis draws on a tradition that sees language as functional as well as communicative; 
and as constituting reality, rather than simply describing it (Wittgenstein 1958, Austin 
1962, Halliday, 1994). In this technique, analysts sensitise themselves to the different 
strategies that can be used to construct meaning and read texts with these strategies in 
mind, uncovering meanings and constructions that might otherwise be overlooked. 
Analysts critically interrogate their own presuppositions and unexamined techniques of 
sense-making and constantly ask, “Why am I reading this passage in this way?” and 
“What features [of the text] produce this reading?” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p168). 
 
3 Results 
 
The analysis of the case-study data indicates the existence of a distinctively engineering-
focussed social identity amongst decision-makers and suggests that decision-makers 
resist, by rhetorical means, arguments for the expansion of the range of measures used in 
flood risk management. Two discourses are employed to this effect: a discourse of 
engineering and a discourse of public accountability. 
 
3.1 Social identity and the engineering discourse 
 
Although decision-makers in the case-study tend to express agreement with the need for a 
richer mix of flood risk management methods, the underlying rhetoric of their talk 
employs the engineering discourse and argues for the measure most consistent with that 
discourse: flood defence. This is perhaps unsurprising given that a number of the 
respondents were trained as engineers, but it nevertheless represents the persistence of the 
engineering paradigm in the face of a policy shift toward a greater focus on non-
engineered approaches.  
 
An example is provided by the following passage, in which the respondent accentuates 
the good qualities of his engineering identity by representing it as heroic:  
 
With a[n engineering] solution you can set up a project team; they‟re very focused; [...] it‟s big 
civil stuff; there‟s lots of big contractors around who welcome the opportunity to get involved and 
you know there‟s lots of public interest around it, it‟s almost self-generating in terms of public 
interest, media, any messages you want to get out. It‟s a bit like the Olympics, you know, it‟s dead 
easy because they‟re tripping over themselves to want to know what‟s going on and so on and so 
forth. Having said that you‟ve got a big initial challenge with a public inquiry, which is a huge 
challenge to get over in the first place. Once you‟ve cleared that I think it‟s fairly straightforward. 
It‟s clear what you‟re delivering, it‟s clear what the outcome should be, there‟s a discrete project 
team set up to deliver it. [With non-engineering work] it‟s going to be far more of a challenge to 
engage people about what it is you‟re seeking to achieve. 
 
In this passage of text, engineering is represented as the profession that provides “big 
solutions” to “big problems”. Such solutions are represented not only as large in scale, 
but also as heroic. In the above passage, the respondent compares big flood defence 
projects to the construction for the 2012 London Olympic Games and gives this a positive 
connotation by saying that people are “tripping over themselves” to find out about such 
projects. Whereas some people are “nervous of big civil engineering projects” and 
consider them “too frightening”, the prototypical engineer is represented as able to “pull 
it off”. An equivalence is therefore created between „large‟ and „heroic‟, thus enhancing 
the social identity of the engineer. 
  
“Big” is also equated with clarity of purpose and method, and with unity of form. This 
indicates structural measures – large-scale engineered measures that focus on reducing 
the probability of a flood of the hazard itself (see Figure 1). Structural measures can be 
contrasted with non-structural measures, which reduce exposure or vulnerability (see 
Figure 1) and usually rely on human interventions to do so. Non-structural measures can, 
in reality, be equally as large as engineered projects, but are described by the respondent 
as “bitty” and as therefore less likely to “engage people”. Although this makes such 
projects “a challenge”, challenge is here associated with uncertainty of aims and so is 
negatively connoted. Even though engineers might be less able to meet this challenge, the 
positive representation of the engineering social identity is therefore preserved. 
 
The importance of the core skills of the engineer for his or her social identity is revealed 
by interviewees‟ descriptions of flood defence as “the traditional way”. Engineers, it is 
argued, prove themselves to their fellows by building lasting and visible constructions 
and not by implementing non-engineered projects that leave no physical, structural 
legacy. Engineering is represented as the discipline of science. Engineers “believe in 
science”, “really want” science and shy away from measures that are represented as 
unscientific (whose predictability is described, dismissively, as “a finger in the air job”). 
As a result, the undertaking of non-engineered projects diminishes individuals‟ 
conformity to the group prototype and undermines their ongoing membership of the 
group. Even worse, the conduct of such work by recent engineering graduates delays the 
development of the skills and portfolio of work that they need in order to become 
chartered engineers and, as a result, reduces the flow of new members into the 
engineering in-group.  
 
Hence, the rhetorical defence of the engineering social identity – i.e. the denigrating 
terms “frightened” and “nervous” to describe people who would promote non-engineered 
approaches; the criticism of those approaches as “unproven”,  “fluffy”, “woolly”, 
“unacceptable” and “second best”, and the heroic representation of those engineers who 
continue to prefer to engage in large-scale engineering work. Non-engineered approaches 
to flood risk management are, at best, depicted as playing a supporting role to 
engineering approaches or as being measures whose use is only justified where a stop-
gap is needed while funding and planning permission are sought for engineered solutions 
and their construction is completed.  
 
The influence of the engineering identity is also evident in the framing given by some 
respondents to discussions about flood risk management and in the representations of 
engineered defences and alternative forms of flood risk management. These are 
expressions of what Giddens (1991) calls practical consciousness – the tacit, normally 
unconscious assumptions and predispositions that people employ as heuristic measures in 
their every-day lives. These assumptions and predispositions are reflected in the 
nomenclature used to describe flood risk managers and also the background they 
normally come from. Those in charge of flood risk management at the local and regional 
level are still known as “flood defence managers”; local decision-making bodies are 
known as “regional flood defence committees”, and the vast majority of the Environment 
Agency‟s annual budget for flood risk management is spent on the maintenance or 
construction of engineered defences. Furthermore, the consultants used for the design of 
flood risk management strategies are, in the main, companies with origins in engineering 
disciplines and the evidence from this study, as well as from the authors‟ experience 
more generally, suggests that many key decision-makers have civil engineering 
backgrounds.  
 
One consequence of decision-makers‟ preference for the engineering approach appears, 
in the case-study, to be the low valorisation of any design that is not centred on 
engineered solutions. This is illustrated in the followed text:  
 
Respondent [...] we changed the word from „scheme‟ to „project‟, because „project‟ felt 
better. When you‟re trying to sort of describe not doing anything, you know? 
We‟ve got this project, it‟s to resolve this need and the way we‟re going to do 
this is by doing very little. [...]  But a „project‟ was a better way, because [...] you 
will work with local people with a project that empowered the people to do 
something for themselves – maybe giving them funding to have a committee or 
whatever – something that empowered them to actually manage themselves, 
rather than expect that hard defences would be put in place.  
Interviewer So by changing the term do you… do you allow different things to be included 
within it?  
Respondent Yeah, I think you do. [...] I think changing the language is very important. [...] I 
think „scheme‟, because it‟s actually in grant memoranda, in the financial 
memoranda, these words are there, cast in stone, they mean something. You look 
at all the guidance that refers to „schemes‟ and this infers [engineering works]. 
 
In this interview extract, although some non-structured flood risk management techniques 
are represented in a positive fashion (“something that empowered them to actually 
manage themselves”), the overall project design is nevertheless represented as a choice 
between engineered defence or inaction and the proposal that consists of mainly non-
structural elements is described as “not doing anything” and “doing very little”. In other 
words, the text simultaneously reflects two different rational modalities – one that reflects 
the rhetoric of flood defence and connotes non-structural measures as valueless, and 
another that uses the rhetoric of flood risk management and connotes them as valuable. 
As argued by Jovchelovich (2002), this state of cognitive polyphasia indicates the 
presence of conflicting interests – in this case, the desire to adhere to the familiar 
engineering culture and the desire to pay some dues to the ideology being promulgated by 
central government.  
 
Respondents themselves seem to be aware of this conflict and show signs of trying to 
adjust the linguistic repertoire of their profession in order to reduce the gap between the 
two rationalities. The respondent above acknowledges the ability of terminology to 
structure thinking and claims to have attempted to manipulate that phenomenon by 
introducing a change in the language that is used. The substitution of “project” for 
“scheme”, he argues, would allow the inclusion of approaches that did not involve 
engineering – such as, for example, measures that empowered residents to manage the 
risk of flooding themselves. Another respondent states that he and his team had 
intentionally tried to change the terms they used in order to encourage the inclusion of 
more non-engineered approaches to flood risk management: 
 
[...] rather than diving straight into structural measures, we will have this overview to say „okay, 
for particular areas the best approach is a combination of things‟. We have sort of coined the 
phrase „basket of measures‟ so the „basket of measures‟ are some structural [i.e. engineered flood 
defences], some non-structural, some capital, some revenue. 
 
However, there was little evidence of these new terms having found their way into 
normal spoken usage, for respondents still generally spoke of „schemes‟ rather than 
„projects‟ or „baskets of measures‟. The habitual terminology used by social and 
professional groups does not change easily and instrumental manipulations of language 
can meet with resistance. Hence, the concept of “flood plain management” used by the 
Environment Agency (2007) to define an approach that included all non-engineered 
measures is described critically by project team members as “that FPM thing”, a “rag-bag 
of different measures” and “not a good descriptor”. 
 
The above discussion suggests that the social identity of flood risk managers in the case-
study centres on the characteristics of a prototypical engineer who implements heroic-
scale measures that have scientifically predictable impacts. As described above, this 
identity has been codified in the language used to describe decision-makers. It also 
includes embedded negative assumptions about the value of non-engineered measures 
and defines its terms in such a way as to implicitly exclude such measures from a normal 
repertoire of options. 
 
Individual identities are fluid and change in response to the forces exerted by surrounding 
cultures (Kumar, 1997) and, if we follow the line taken by some modernists, also 
according to a person‟s perception of the requirements of their own ontological security 
(Giddens 1991). Hence, although the increasingly pervasive culture of „flood risk 
management‟ encourages the adoption of an identity that valorise techniques not 
traditionally associated with the engineering tradition, decision-makers‟ day-to-day 
location in a social context that valorises the engineering culture leads to a situation of 
polyphasia in which they simultaneously favour large-scale engineered solutions.  
 
3.2 Routes of accountability and the discourse of public opinion 
 
When this underlying engineering-dominated value system is questioned (as it was by the 
interviewer), flood risk managers tend to fall back on an alternative line of argument: one 
provided by the discourse of public accountability. Their accountability to the public 
appears to play a greater rhetorical role than their accountability to government policy-
makers, whose influence is given far less prominence. 
 
As the same time as the roots of accountability to central government have been 
weakened by the introduction of arms-length management arrangements, the New Public 
Management agenda has promoted greater and more direct accountability to the public 
(Hood, 1991). As a result, the influence of public opinion has waxed while that of central 
government has waned. 
 
Public consultation forms an increasingly prominent part of the responsibilities of bodies, 
such as the Environment Agency, that have responsibility for managing environmental 
risks. This, our study suggests, may have led to the attribution of increased importance to 
public opinion in the matter of selecting flood risk management strategies. Although 
decision-makers continue to represent themselves as the experts in flood risk 
management, they also depict it as a collaborative process and consider themselves 
accountable to a wider public: 
 
Interviewer Aren‟t you kind of, as the „experts‟, supposed to do what is expertly judged right? 
Respondent You would think so. (Second respondent: Yes) I think those days are long gone 
and I think we are accountable much more for what we do and how we do it and 
we have to bring people along with us. Otherwise it just doesn‟t work these days. 
 
The engineering discourse and the discourse of public accountability at first appear 
unlikely allies: the former, after all, is premised on narrowly framed scientific rationality, 
whereas the latter relies on a broader range of considerations including affect and social 
norms (Harries, 2008b). Nevertheless, almost without exception the decision-makers in 
this study gave public opinion as a fundamental reason for their continued reluctance to 
adopt non-engineered adaptation measures. One reason for this is the operational 
definition of „the public‟ that these decision-makers used – a definition restricted to 
recently flooded people, who tend to favour measures that keep water away from their 
homes over measures that reduce the damage caused: 
 
Interviewer Who does that really mean when you say „the public‟? 
Respondent  The individuals who are affected by the […] It’s predominantly those who are 
affected by the flooding. I don‟t think the population outside of the flood plain are 
that bothered. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
This narrow conception of „the public‟ is probably the result of two factors. First, the 
historically reactive nature of the Environment Agency‟s flood risk management function 
has traditionally led to projects only being initiated where flood events have stimulated 
public demand for defences. In the past, therefore, the primary customer group for flood 
risk management strategies consisted of people who had experienced floods, rather than 
wider constituencies such as taxpayers or voters as a whole, or those at risk of flooding. 
Secondly, any existing tendency to neglect at-risk populations who have not been flooded 
is encouraged by their relative disinterest in flood risk management. Identified by Kates 
(1962) and frequently confirmed since (e.g. Tunstall et al., 2006; Grothmann and 
Reusswig, 2006), this disinterest can discourage decision-makers from investing time and 
resources in the needs of such communities and lead to them being, in effect, 
disenfranchised:  
 
I‟d rather work with communities who are up for it, who are interested, who do want to work with 
us, where there is a real sense that actually they can benefit and we can make a difference by 
working together; rather than with communities where there‟s a lack of interest.   
 
In reality, not even all those who have been flooded are fully considered when decision-
makers frame the concept of public accountability. As one respondent admits, it is often 
only the views of the “vociferous ones” that are taken into account.  
 
The use of this representation of „the public‟ is unsurprising, for it reflects the forces at 
work in the consultation process. Consultation meetings are attended, predominantly, by 
people who have themselves experienced flooding and, more particularly, by the more 
confident and “vociferous” flood victims. Being communicated to decision-makers 
directly, the needs and expectations of these sections of the public will be more vivid than 
those of others and will therefore also be more influential (see Nisbett and Ross, 1980). 
Furthermore, key decision-makers know that they will be called on to explain their 
decisions to these same householders in future face-to-face meetings, so will tend to 
consider them their most important public constituency: 
 
You know, over the years, having experienced flooding and going and talking to people on the 
ground when they‟re being flooded, the trauma of all of that is such that, you know, if you say to 
them, “well that‟s still going to happen but you‟ll get an hour‟s more warning”, or “you might be 
able to put up some boards to protect your home”… I would find it very difficult. 
 
Respondent [The decision makers on this project have] had significant amounts of 
involvement: public meetings, etc. And this is not untypical. It‟s typical across 
all EA projects where issues have arisen; staff would get out there in front of… 
of… of members of the public and they were always uncomfortable, it seems to 
me, to say, „no‟. They always wanted to be helpful […] 
Interviewer So rather than say „no‟ [to major infrastructure projects], they were saying…? 
Respondent “We‟ll see what we can do”; “we‟ll take it further”; “we‟ll do more studies”. 
 
Respondents in the study represent flood victims‟ behaviour as far more forceful than 
central policy statements that favour the wider portfolio of measures. Groups representing 
flooded residents are said to be “articulate” and “adept at political action”. This is 
described as making decision-makers feel personally vulnerable (“we‟re at the end of 
that, in all the public surgeries”; “people were tearing each others‟ eyes out at the first 
two flood forum meetings”; “the consultants are terrified of the [residents group]”). Such 
emotional and social force has an appeal beyond the rational calculation of scientific 
benefits and costs. It appeals to decision-makers‟ desire to avoid stigmatisation and to 
forge and maintain identities as people who perform a valued public service and are 
respected for doing so.  
 
As a result of the above, the preferences of flooded communities fuel a public opinion 
discourse that is a powerful ally to the engineering discourse. This helps protect and 
sustain a social identity that is centred on the notion of flood defence and that shies away 
from the widespread adoption of a broad portfolio of risk management approaches. 
Centrally determined policy objectives can be forced through using performance targets 
and auditable standards of practice but, in the absence of specific standards and targets, 
are less vivid and immediate than the emotionally-framed demands of flooded 
householders. For this reason also, they are less likely to be assimilated into the decision-
making cultures of policy-implementing institutions. 
  
4 Conclusions and discussion 
 
Many societies around the world have institutions that are tasked to protect citizens from 
the effects of environmental risk events, including those associated with climate change. 
Such institutions create for themselves a character, culture, identity and rhetoric that are 
based on the particular beliefs and practices that enable them to perform the functions for 
which they were created. The research reported here suggests that these beliefs and 
practices might not be congruent with the current environmental and demographic 
context, in which the range and scale of the risks is growing, and in response to which a 
far broader range of adaptation measures needs to be employed.  
 
Legislative action might be one way of addressing this institutional inertia, but the 
success of this course of action is in no way guaranteed. As was the case after the 2007 
UK floods, major environmental disasters tend to motivate governments to set aside the 
necessary resources for the creation of new legislation. In such cases, however, public 
pressure makes it difficult for societies to introduce measures that reduce vulnerability 
but do not also reduce the probability of an event occurring.  
 
If public opinion is allowed to retain its current level of direct influence on the practice of 
environmental risk management, the use of an expanded range of adaptation measures is 
likely to be limited. In the UK, as in many other parts of the western world, members of 
the public have come to depend on the feeling of safety from nature for their sense of 
essential security (Harries, 2008b) – either because they are accustomed to representing 
nature as harmless (Hewitt, 1995) or because they have come to rely on the state to fully 
protect them. This representation of nature as essentially benign is not easily changed for, 
like all social representations, it is defended against contradictory evidence by perceptive 
filters and blocks (see Abric, 1984). For this reason, only the experience of repeated or 
particularly severe environmental events prompts changes in representations and 
associated behaviours (see Kates, 1971). The experience of single, less extreme, events 
has little effect on the representation of nature and can result in increased popular 
pressure for more measures to reduce event probability, making it harder for decision-
makers to include vulnerability reduction in the range of risk management measures. 
Hence, for example, the increased funding announced by Defra after the 2007 floods was 
depicted by the Government as an increase in funding for flood defence rather than as 
money for both mitigation and impact reduction. 
 
As illustrated in the above discussion, the influence of the public preference for 
probability reduction over consequence reduction is magnified by the present fashion for 
community consultation in public sector decision making (e.g. Defra, 2002; European 
Commission, 2004). Although public consultation “democratises the delivery of 
environmental policy” (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2008), it tends to attract the involvement 
only of those most directly and personally affected by the issue and most vociferous in 
their demand for change. Inevitably, local level decision-makers begin to perceive this 
group as „the public‟ to whom they are responsible. As a result, until some means is 
found of making decision-makers accountable to policy-makers for national level 
priorities around environmental sustainability and distributive justice, these priorities will 
tend to be neglected in the face of the demands of a relatively small number of „victims‟ 
who insist on the elimination of the risk in their own localities. The absence of any such 
accountability mechanism in the present system results in a distortion of decision-making 
around adaptation, and prevents it from balancing the interests and values of different 
parties rather than just taking account of the views of recent flood victims (Paavola and 
Adger, 2005).  
 
The ability of the most keenly aggrieved members of the public to hold back adaptation is 
also evident in a second area of climate change impact: coastal erosion. This is of 
relevance to the present argument because budgets and polices for coastal erosion 
management are developed by Defra largely in parallel with those for flood risk 
management. As reported by O‟Riordan et al. (2008), Defra‟s efforts to substitute a 
policy of managed realignment for the previous policy of defence is, in some places, 
being held back by the pressure placed on local decision-makers by highly vocal 
residents. For example, they describe how local protests at the withdrawal of central 
government funding led one local authority to effectively circumvent national policy 
aims by investing its own money in cliff protection. 
 
A first step toward avoiding the allocation of too much influence to victims of adverse 
environmental events should be to give greater prominence to the discourse of social 
justice. Social justice is multi-faceted (Walzer, 1983) and true fairness can only be 
achieved if adaptation operates within all of these facets (Adger et al., 2006). Yet the 
engineering approach currently focuses almost exclusively on utilitarian social justice and 
therefore falls short of delivering social justice from the perspective of equality and 
environmental sustainability (see Johnson et al., 2007). In addition, it fails to discriminate 
between benefits and costs that accrue to people who choose to live in high risk areas 
while fully aware of the risk and those that had no choice but to live in them or who 
could not have been expected to have been aware of the risk when they chose to do so.  
 
One way of improving the social justice of the current system would be to facilitate more 
local funding of structural projects. In those cases where local people have knowingly 
chosen to live or work in a high risk area and wish to continue to do so, mechanisms 
should be provided for them to pay for appropriate measures themselves. In England, 
Defra has already changed its guidance to make this possible for flood defence schemes 
and there are examples, also, of communities funding their own coastal defence measures 
(see above). The problem with this kind of approach, however, is that it injects into the 
decision-making process the need to decide the vexed and contentious question of which 
communities have chosen to locate themselves in risk areas and which have had the risk 
imposed upon them.  
 
A second step toward more balanced adaptation would be to operationalise the 
implications of the social justice discourse by facilitating the application of its principles 
within existing decision-making frameworks. To allow the equality benefits of non-
engineered measures to be realised, either these equality benefits should be monetised 
and included in benefit-cost analyses, or those non-engineered approaches that facilitate 
greater equality should, as Johnson et al. (2007) argue with respect to flood risk 
management, be given lower benefit-cost thresholds. 
 
An alternative possibility is suggested by the case of flood risk management in Scotland. 
Penning-Rowsell et al. (2008) report that the relevant managers in Scotland are less 
predisposed towards engineered defences than their counterparts in England because of 
their location in local authorities. Close working with other local authority staff such as 
spatial planners, they argue, has had a significant impact on professional flood risk 
managers‟ attitudes to smaller-scale or less engineered measures, causing them to be 
“more flexible” and “subject to fewer professional constraints” (p. 149). This suggests 
that the integration of managers of environmental risks with professional groups who 
have different risk management cultures might be one way of encouraging a more 
flexible response to climate change. 
 
In addition to cultural change, however, it is also necessary to adapt the systems that were 
designed to realise the old cultures. Examples from flood risk management include 
Defra‟s rules for funding flood risk management projects, which favour engineering 
projects by constraining capital expenditure less than revenue expenditure; the system for 
monitoring Environment Agency performance, which currently incentivises the use of 
flood defence more than the use of other measures, and the system for prioritising 
expenditure, which frames the question of prioritisation in such a way as to imply 
engineered works. 
 
Perhaps the most significant lesson from this study concerns the balance between the 
influence of public consultation and centrally determined policy on local strategies for 
climate change and adaptation to environmental risk. Our research suggests that the 
institutional bias towards engineered measures, as opposed to behavioural approaches, is 
legitimised and reinforced by decision-makers‟ exposure to the most vociferous 
proponents of that approach – the most badly affected and most vociferous victims of  
adverse environmental events. It is unreasonable and probably also unrealistic to expect 
decision-makers to ignore the pressure that such people exert, for the status of „victim‟ 
confers a widely accepted moral authority. However, in order to speed the introduction of 
a wider portfolio of measures to adapt to climate change, some means needs to found of 
maintaining decision-makers‟ awareness of the perspective of the victims while leaving 
them less vulnerable to its social, emotional and political force.  
 
The emotional and practical needs of flood victims do need to be addressed, but a way 
also needs to be found of ensuring that other, wider, priorities have a voice at the local 
level. This may require a review of current policy and practice with regard to public 
consultation. It should also prompt national policy-makers to consider carefully the 
degree to which they relinquish control over the implementation of policies for local 
adaptation to climate change. 
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